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Abstract
■ Although growing evidence has shown that remembering
the past and imagining the future recruit a common core net-
work of frontal-parietal-temporal regions, the extent to which
these regions contribute to the temporal dimension of auto-
biographical thought remains unclear. In this fMRI study, we
focused on the event-sequencing aspect of time and examined
whether ordering past and future events involve common neural
substrates. Participants had to determine which of two past (or
future) events occurred (or would occur) before the other, and
these order judgments were compared with a task requiring to
think about the content of the same past or future events. For
both past and future events, we found that the left posterior
hippocampus was more activated when establishing the order
of events, whereas the anterior hippocampus was more acti-
vated when representing their content. Aside from the hippo-
campus, most of the brain regions that were activated when
thinking about temporal order (notably the intraparietal sulcus,
dorsolateral pFC, dorsal anterior cingulate, and visual cortex)
lied outside the core network and may reflect the involvement
of controlled processes and visuospatial imagery to locate events
in time. Collectively, these findings suggest (a) that the same
processing operations are engaged for ordering past events
and planned future events in time, (b) that anterior and pos-
terior portions of the hippocampus are involved in processing
different aspects of autobiographical thought, and (c) that
temporal order is not necessarily an intrinsic property of mem-
ory or future thought but instead requires additional, controlled
processes. ■
INTRODUCTION
Humans live in subjective time (Suddendorf & Corballis,
2007; Tulving, 2002): We have internalized a view of the
past and future as parts of a temporal framework filled
with the happenings of our life (Friedman, 2005), and
much of our everyday thinking consists in mental travels
to such past and future times (DʼArgembeau, Renaud, &
Van der Linden, 2011; Berntsen & Jacobsen, 2008; Klinger
& Cox, 1987). This ability to conceive of nonpresent times
has recently attracted growing attention in psychology
and neuroscience because of its key role in many funda-
mental aspects of human cognition and behavior, such as
planning, decision-making, and self-regulation (Schacter,
2012; Szpunar, 2010; Boyer, 2008; Suddendorf & Corballis,
2007; Atance & OʼNeill, 2001).
Although considerable progress has been made in elu-
cidating how the content of past and future thoughts is
constructed and elaborated (for review, see Mullally &
Maguire, 2014; DʼArgembeau, 2012; Schacter et al.,
2012; Szpunar, 2010), the processing of time itself remains
elusive, especially as regards to prospective thought (Klein,
2013; Szpunar, 2011; Friedman, 2005). Various kinds of
temporal information can potentially be available when
we think about past and future events (e.g., dates vs. feel-
ings of distance; Skowronski & Sedikides, 2007; Friedman,
1993, 2005). Among these, the event-sequencing aspect
of time (i.e., the way events are temporally ordered with
respect to each other) may be particularly important for
keeping track of goal progress and for planning and orga-
nizing behavior (Conway, 2009). Previous research has
shown that people have some knowledge about the order
of past events (St Jacques, Rubin, LaBar, & Cabeza, 2008;
Skowronski, Walker, & Betz, 2003), but there is less evi-
dence that order information is coherently represented
for envisioned future events (Friedman, 2005). Further-
more, it is unknown whether similar or distinct neurocog-
nitive processes are involved in ordering past and future
events in time.
Here, we sought to address these questions by identi-
fying possible commonalities and differences in the neu-
ral basis of temporal order processing in past and future
thought. Important insights into the neurocognitive under-
pinnings of prospective thought have recently been gained
from functional neuroimaging. Indeed, a growing number
of studies have shown that remembering past events and
imagining future events recruit a common “core” network
of frontal, parietal, and temporal regions (for a review, see
Schacter et al., 2012), suggesting that past and future
thoughts involve common representations and processesUniversity of Liège
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(Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Hassabis & Maguire, 2007;
Schacter & Addis, 2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007).
Whether such commonalities embrace temporal infor-
mation is unclear, however. On the one hand, it has been
found that several regions of the core network (notably
the hippocampus) are activated when imagining events or
scenes that are not located at particular times in the past or
future (Summerfield, Hassabis, & Maguire, 2010; Hassabis,
Kumaran, & Maguire, 2007), suggesting that these regions
support nontemporal processes (Mullally & Maguire, 2014;
Eacott & Easton, 2012; Hassabis & Maguire, 2007). On the
other hand, there is evidence that the hippocampus is
activated when remembering temporal order (e.g., Ekstrom,
Copara, Isham, Wang, & Yonelinas, 2011; Lehn et al., 2009),
suggesting that the hippocampusplays a role in the temporal/
sequential organization of memory (Eichenbaum, 2013).
Besides the hippocampus, other candidate regions for
processing temporal order in past and future thought
include lateral prefrontal and parietal cortices. The pFC
has long been hypothesized to play a key role in the pro-
cessing of time (Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997; Ingvar,
1985)—in particular, the temporal organization of be-
havioral sequences (Fuster, 2001)—and neuroimaging
studies have demonstrated activations of lateral prefrontal
regions when people remember the order of past events
(e.g., Ekstrom et al., 2011; St Jacques et al., 2008). More-
over, temporal information is often construed in terms of
spatial representations (e.g., mapping events along a
mental time line; Nunez & Cooperrider, 2013; Christian,
Miles, & Macrae, 2012; Arzy, Adi-Japha, & Blanke, 2009;
Boroditsky, 2000), and the parietal cortex may play a role
in this process (Bueti & Walsh, 2009). Two recent studies
indeed found activations in prefrontal and parietal regions
when processing temporal information in future thought
(Nyberg, Kim,Habib, Levine, & Tulving, 2010; Arzy, Collette,
Ionta, Fornari, & Blanke, 2009), but the exact functions of
these regions remain unclear and the extent to which they
contribute to temporal order processing is unknown.
Functional neuroimaging provides an interesting tool
for investigating whether similar or distinct processing
operations are involved in establishing temporal order in
past and future thought (Mather, Cacioppo, & Kanwisher,
2013). Onepossibility is that order is processeddifferently for
retrospective and prospective thought because of an inher-
ent asymmetry between the two sides of time (Suddendorf,
2010): Past events already occurred and cannot be changed,
so order is fixed and determined; future events have yet to
happen and cannot be known with certainty, so order is
more malleable. If this asymmetry is mirrored in the mecha-
nisms used to process temporal order, distinct (or at least
partly distinct) brain regions should be implicated in deter-
mining the order of past and future events. On the other
hand, research suggests that we rarely have direct access to
temporal information and determining the times of past
events often involves reconstructive processes, such as in-
ferring the locations of events within conventional time
patterns (e.g., parts of the day, week, or year; Friedman,
1993, 2004). Similar location-based processes could be in-
volved in determining the times of future events (Friedman,
2005), in which case largely overlapping neural activations
should be observed when ordering past and future events
(quantitative differences could still be apparent, however,
for example, if order processing is more difficult for one
kind of events than for the other).
To test these predictions, participants were scanned
while completing a temporal judgment task that required
them to determine which of two past events occurred
before the other (past order condition) or which of
two planned future events would occur before the other
(future order condition); the events were selected from
individualized prescan interviews in which participants
were asked to recall a series of events that happened
to them in the past week and to imagine a series of
events that they think will happen to them in the next
week. This order judgment task was compared with a
task requiring to think about the content of the same
past and future events: Participants were presented with
pairs of events containing a past or future event they
generated during the prescan interview and an event that
did not happen to them in the past week or would not
happen to them in the next week, and they had to deter-
mine which of the two events belongs to their personal
past or future (past and future event conditions). The
four conditions thus constituted a 2 (task: order vs.
event) × 2 (temporal orientation: past vs. future) factorial
design that allowed us to investigate commonalities and
differences in the neural processing of temporal order in
past and future thought.
To further investigate whether similar processes are
involved in determining the order of past and future
events, we also varied the temporal distance between
the two events presented in the order judgment task.
Previous research has evidenced a temporal distance effect
in order judgments for past events: The farther apart in
time the two events are, the easier the judgment becomes
(e.g., RT decreases; Skowronski et al., 2003). If similar pro-
cessing operations are involved in determining the order of
past and future events, increasing the difficulty of order
judgments (by decreasing temporal distance between
events) should have similar effects for both types of events
in terms of behavioral performance and neural activity.
METHODS
Participants
Participants were 22 right-handed young adults (13women;
mean age = 21 years, range = 18–25 years) who reported
no history of psychiatric or neurological disorders and no
current use of any psychoactive medications. Two addi-
tional participants were run but excluded from data analysis
because of task noncompliance or excessive head move-
ment during image acquisition. All participants gave their
written informed consent to take part in the study, which
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was approved by the ethics committee of the Medical
School of the University of Liège.
Materials and Procedures
Prescan Interview
The day before the fMRI session, participants were asked
to recall a series of events that happened to them in the
past week and to imagine a series of events that they
thought would happen to them in the next week. The
instructions specified that the recalled and imagined
events should be specific (unique events that happen
at a particular place and time) and not routine events that
could happen on any day; examples were provided to
illustrate what would or would not be considered as spe-
cific events. The experimenter then went through the
past 7 days and the next 7 days one by one with the par-
ticipant to collect 10 specific events for each temporal
orientation (i.e., past and future; for the future period,
only events that would happen after the scanning session
planned on the next day were considered). For each re-
ported event, the participant indicated the day on which
this event happened (or would likely happen) and pro-
vided a short sentence summarizing the essence of the
event; these sentences included information about a
place, person, and/or activity that individualized each re-
ported event but did not include temporal information
(e.g., “to fetch my parents at the airport”).
fMRI Session
Participants performed four tasks while in the scanner.
Two tasks consisted of determining the temporal order
of event occurrence, either in the past (past order condi-
tion) or in the future (future order condition). In both
tasks, participants were presented with pairs of past or
future events and had to judge which of the two events
occurred before the other (in the past order condition)
or would occur before the other (in the future order con-
dition). Each of the 10 past events and 10 future events
generated in the prescan interview were presented three
times, in association with different events, such that a to-
tal of 30 pairs of events were presented for each temporal
orientation. The lag between the two events of each pair
ranged between 1 and 6 days, and care was taken to
match the past and future conditions in this regard; the
mean average lag was 2.77 days in the past condition and
2.33 days in the future condition, t(21) = 0.49, p = .63,
and the mean standard deviation of the lag was 1.54 in
the past condition and 1.48 in the future condition, t(21) =
0.96, p = .35.
In the two other tasks, participants were presented
with pairs of events that included one of the past or
future events that had been generated during the prescan
interview and one event that did not happen to them in
the past week or would not likely happen to them in the
next week (i.e., an event taken from another participant).
For each pair, participants had to select which of the two
events belonged to their personal past (past event con-
dition) or future (future event condition). Each of the
10 past events and 10 future events generated in the pre-
scan interview were presented three times, in association
with different nonpersonal events (in total, there were 10
nonpersonal past events and 10 nonpersonal future
events that were each presented three times), such that a
total of 30 pairs of events were presented for each temporal
orientation.
The 30 trials of each task were presented in blocks of
three trials. Each block started with a cue slide (2 sec)
indicating which task participants had to perform (e.g.,
future order). Then, three pairs of events were presented
successively for 6 sec each. For each pair, the two sentences
summarizing the events were presented above each other
and were separated by the symbol “–.” Participants pressed
one of two designated buttons on a response box to select
which of the two events happened or would happen be-
fore the other (in the order conditions) or to select which
of the two events belonged to their personal past or
future (in the event conditions). They were further in-
structed to keep thinking about the time when the events
occurred or would occur (in the order conditions) or about
the content of the personal events (in the event condi-
tions) during the entire duration of presentation of the
pairs on the screen (i.e., during the 6 sec). All trials were
separated by a fixation cross of variable duration (lasting
between 2 and 3 sec). Ten blocks of trials for each con-
dition were presented in a pseudorandom order such that
a particular condition could not be repeated immediately
and could not be separated by more than six blocks of a
different condition. Within blocks of the order conditions,
the order of presentation of the different time lags between
the two events of each pair was determined randomly.
Immediately before scanning, participants were presented
with some practice trials (using fictive events that did not
belong to their personal past or future) to familiarize them
with the tasks.
Postscan Interview
Postscan interviews were conducted to assess the extent
to which participants followed the instructions during the
scanning session. All participants indicated that they
made order judgments by thinking about the time when
the events occurred (for past events) or would occur (for
future events) rather than attempting to remember the
dates they provided during the prescan interview. One
participant mentioned that the expected date of a future
event had changed since the prescan interview and that
hemadeorder judgments in reference to this new schedule
during scanning; therefore, this new expected date of the
future event was taken into account for computing correct
responses.
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fMRI Data Acquisition
fMRI time series were acquired on a 3T head-only scanner
(Magnetom Allegra, Siemens Medical Solutions, Erlangen,
Germany) operated with the standard transmit–receive
quadrature head coil. Multislice T2*-weighted functional
images were acquired with a gradient-echo EPI sequence
using axial slice orientation and covering the whole brain
(34 slices, field of view [FoV] = 192 × 192 mm2, voxel size
3 × 3 × 3 mm3, 25% interslice gap, matrix size 64 × 64 ×
34, repetition time [TR] = 2040 msec, echo time [TE] =
30 msec, flip angle = 90°). For each participant, around
620 functional volumes were acquired, and the first three
volumes were discarded to avoid T1 saturation effects.
After the EPI acquisition, a gradient-recalled sequence
was applied to acquire two complex images with different
TEs (TE=4.92 and 7.38msec, respectively; TR= 367msec,
FoV = 230 × 230mm2, 64 × 64 matrix, 34 transverse slices
with 3 mm thickness and 25% interslice gap, flip angle =
90°, bandwidth = 260 Hz/pixel) and generate field maps
for distortion correction of the EPI images. A structural
MR scanwas obtained at the endof the session (T1-weighted
3-D MP-RAGE sequence, TR = 1960 msec, TE = 4.4 msec,
FoV = 230 × 173 mm2, matrix size 256 × 192 × 176, voxel
size 0.9 × 0.9 × 0.9 mm3).
fMRI Data Analysis
Datawerepreprocessed andanalyzedusingSPM8(Wellcome
Department of Imaging Neuroscience, http//www.fil.ion.
ucl.ac.uk/spm). EPI time series were corrected for motion
and distortion using Realign and Unwarp (Andersson,
Hutton, Ashburner, Turner, & Friston, 2001) together with
the Fieldmap Toolbox (Hutton et al., 2002). The mean re-
aligned EPI image was coregistered to the structural T1
image, and the coregistration parameters were applied to
the realigned EPI time series. The T1 image was segmented
into gray matter, white matter, and cerebrospinal fluid,
using the unified segmentation approach (Ashburner &
Friston, 2005), and the coregistered functional images
were normalized to MNI space (voxel size: 2 × 2 ×
2 mm3) using the normalization parameters obtained from
the segmentation procedure. Finally, the functional images
were smoothed with a Gaussian kernel with FWHM of
8 mm.
Preprocessed fMRI data were analyzed using the gen-
eral linear model. For each participant, the task phase
(onset = presentation of the event pair; duration = 6 sec)
was modeled separately for each condition (i.e., past order,
future order, past event, future event) and convolved with
the canonical hemodynamic response function to create
regressors of interest. RTs were entered in the model as
linear parametric regressors to ensure that differences
between conditions are not simply due to differences in
RTs (see Behavioral Results). The design matrix also
included the realignment parameters to account for any
residual movement-related effect. The canonical hemo-
dynamic response function was used and a high-pass filter
was implemented using a cutoff period of 128 sec to
remove the low-frequency drifts from the time series. Serial
autocorrelations were estimated with a restricted maxi-
mum likelihood algorithm with an autoregressive model
of order 1 (+ white noise).
For each participant, four contrasts of interest cor-
responding to the effect of each condition were computed.
The individual contrast images were then entered into
a second-level random-effects analysis using a two-way
repeated-measures ANOVA. This generated a statistical
parametric map of F values for the main effect of Temporal
Orientation (past vs. future), the main effect of Task (order
vs. event), and the interaction between the two factors;
t contrasts were then performed to examine the direc-
tion of effects. In addition, to identify brain regions that
were commonly recruited when processing temporal
information for past and future events, we carried out a
conjunction analysis (testing the conjunction null hypoth-
esis; Friston, Penny, & Glaser, 2005) of the order > event
contrast for past events and the order > event contrast for
future events.
We also examined changes in the neural correlates of
temporal order judgments as a function of the temporal
distance between the two events constituting the event
pairs. For each participant, we estimated a general linear
model that included regressors for the task phase of each
condition (i.e., past order, future order, past event, future
event), linear parametric regressors coding for RTs, two
linear parametric regressors indexing time lag (i.e., the
number of days separating the two events of a pair, which
ranged from 1 to 6) for the past and future order condi-
tions, and the realignment parameters. Subsequently,
random-effects analyses were performed on the param-
eter estimates of the parametric regressor for temporal
lag in the past and future order conditions separately,
using one-sample t tests. To ensure that the regions that
were correlated with temporal lag were indeed recruited
for making temporal order judgments, the conditions of
interest were inclusively masked (at p< .001, uncorrected)
with the main effect of Task (order > event) identified in
the two-way ANOVA described above.
We report activations that were statistically significant at
the .05 level, corrected for multiple comparisons (family-
wise error, FWE) at the voxel level over the entire brain
volume. For our a priori ROIs in the hippocampus, lateral
pFC, and parietal cortex, we used small volume correction
( p < .05, FWE-corrected) within anatomically defined
ROIs. ROIs corresponding to the bilateral hippocampus
(Amunts et al., 2005) and bilateral intraparietal sulcus
(IPS; Scheperjans, Eickhoff, et al., 2008; Scheperjans,
Hermann, et al., 2008; Choi et al., 2006) were created
using the SPM Anatomy Toolbox v1.8 (Eickhoff et al.,
2005), and an ROI including the bilateral middle frontal
gyrus was created using the Wake Forest University Pick-
Atlas Utility v3.0 (Maldjian, Laurienti, Kraft, & Burdette,
2003).
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RESULTS
Behavioral Results
We first examined whether judgment accuracy and RTs
differed across the four conditions. Correct responses
for order judgments were calculated using the dates pro-
vided for each event during the prescan interview. For
event judgments, correct responses corresponded to
the identification of the events that were part of the par-
ticipantsʼ personal past or future. A 2 (Task: order vs.
event) × 2 (Temporal Orientation: past vs. future) repeated-
measures ANOVA on correct responses showed that accu-
racy was significantly higher for event judgments than for
order judgments, F(1, 21) = 40.58, p < .001, ηp
2 = 0.66;
the main effect of Temporal Orientation and the inter-
action were not significant, F(1, 21) = 1.64, p = .21, ηp
2 =
0.07, and F(1, 21) = 1.04, p = .32, ηp
2 = 0.05, respectively
(see Table 1 for means and SDs). For both past and future
events, correct order judgments were significantly higher
than chance (i.e., higher than 0.50), t(21) = 15.03, p <
.001, and t(21) = 15.10, p < .001, respectively. A two-way
ANOVA on RTs also revealed a significant effect of Task,
showing that responses were faster for event judgments
than for order judgments, F(1, 21) = 294.45, p < .001,
ηp
2 = 0.93; the main effect of Temporal Orientation and
the interaction were not significant, F(1, 21) = 0.69, p =
.42, ηp
2 = 0.03, and F(1, 21) = 2.03, p = .17, ηp
2 = 0.09,
respectively (see Table 1 for means and SDs).
Next, we examined whether order judgments were
affected by the temporal distance between the two
events of a pair. The number of days separating the
two events (which ranged from 1 to 6) was used as a pre-
dictor variable in a regression model with RT as depen-
dent variable. An interaction term was also included in
the model to investigate whether the effect of temporal
distance differed across temporal orientations (past vs.
future). To account for the hierarchical structure of the
data (i.e., trials are nested within participants and are
thus not independent), we used multilevel modeling
(Goldstein, 2011) with trials (event pairs) as level 1 units
and participants as level 2 units. A random intercept
multilevel model yielded a significant effect of temporal
distance, indicating that RT was longer when the time
separating the two events decreased (coefficient =
−52.98, SE = 18.35, Z = 2.89, p = .004). The interaction
term was not significant (coefficient =−19.28, SE= 16.03,
Z = 1.20, p = .23), indicating that the effect of temporal
distance on RT was similar for past and future events.
fMRI Results
The brain regions involved in processing temporal order
in past and future thought were investigated using a 2
(Task: order vs. event) × 2 (Temporal Orientation: past
vs. future) repeated-measures ANOVA. This analysis re-
vealed a main effect of Task in several brain regions. On
the other hand, no brain region showed a main effect of
Temporal Orientation or an interaction between Task
and Temporal Orientation.
Table 1. Mean Proportion of Correct Responses and Mean RT
as a Function of Task (Order vs. Event) and Temporal
Orientation (Past vs. Future)
Order Event
Past Future Past Future
Correct
responses
0.85 (0.11) 0.87 (0.12) 0.99 (0.02) 0.99 (0.02)
RT (in msec) 3479 (550) 3371 (469) 2240 (363) 2267 (406)
Standard deviations are provided in parentheses.





Size tx y z
IPS L −30 −60 42 655 7.69
−32 −48 34 same 6.49
−30 −76 32 same 6.32
R 36 −60 32 723 6.88
44 −44 48 same 6.48
Visual cortex R 20 −58 18 1150 7.63
L −10 −78 2 same 6.87
−16 −62 20 88 6.02
Anterior insula R 30 22 2 337 7.55
L −30 24 −2 159 6.83
Dorsal ACC/pre-SMA M 4 22 42 436 7.28
8 28 30 same 5.57
Precuneus M 10 −68 42 568 7.28
M −14 −66 36 same 6.52
Dorsolateral pFC R 30 12 58 166 6.86
48 36 26 147 6.74
L −42 26 24 7 5.24
Rostrolateral pFC R 36 56 −2 24 5.79
26 60 0 28 5.31
Cerebellum L −32 −66 −36 16 5.75
Precentral gyrus L −32 2 58 63 5.43
All regions are significant at p< .05, corrected for multiple comparisons
(FWE) at the voxel level over the entire brain volume. L and R refer to
the left and right hemisphere, respectively. M refers to medial clusters.
For large clusters, local maxima that are more than 10 mm apart are
reported; “same” indicates that these local maxima are part of the same
cluster as the peak reported above.
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To specify the main effect of Task, we first investigated
regions that were significantly more activated when par-
ticipants thought about the temporal order of past or
future events compared with when they thought about
the content of these events. A t contrast revealed in-
creased activation in the IPS bilaterally (along the entire
anterior–posterior axis of the IPS), lateral pFC (in the
dorsolateral pFC bilaterally and in the right rostrolateral
pFC), dorsal ACC/pre-SMA, anterior insula bilaterally, pre-
cuneus, and visual cortex (Table 2, Figure 1). We did not
find significant activation in the hippocampus after
whole-brain correction for multiple comparisons ( p <
.05, FWE-corrected), but FWE correction within an ana-
tomically defined hippocampal ROI (see Methods) re-
vealed voxels in the left posterior hippocampus that
showed higher activation when processing temporal order
(peak MNI coordinate: x = −24, y = −36, z = 6; t =
4.29, p= .02; cluster size: 24 voxels; Figure 2). The reverse
t contrast revealed a number of brain regions that were
significantly more activated when participants thought
about the content of past and future events compared with
when they thought about their temporal order, including
the lateral temporal cortex bilaterally, medial prefrontal
regions (medial OFC and dorsomedial pFC), and anterior
hippocampus bilaterally (see Table 3, Figure 3). Because
the proportion of correct responses differed between the
order and event conditions (see Behavioral Results), we
also rerun the same analyses using only trials for which par-
ticipants provided a correct response. All results reported
above remained unchanged.
To further identify brain regions that were commonly
recruited when processing the order of past and future
events, we carried out a conjunction analysis (testing
the conjunction null hypothesis) of the order > event
contrast for past events and the order > event contrast
Figure 1. Brain regions showing increased activity for order versus event judgments. Displayed at p < .05 (FWE-corrected) on the mean structural
MRI of all participants. Bar graphs show the mean parameter estimates for each condition (error bars represent SEM ). dlPFC = dorsolateral pFC;
rlPFC = rostrolateral pFC; AI = anterior insula.
Figure 2. Area of the left posterior hippocampus showing increased
activity for order versus event judgments. Displayed at p < .001
(uncorrected) on the mean structural MRI of all participants. Bar graphs
show the mean parameter estimates for each condition (error bars
represent SEM ).
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for future events. This revealed common activations in the
IPS bilaterally, dorsal ACC/pre-SMA, right dorsolateral pFC,
visual cortex, and left posterior hippocampus (Table 4).
The other regions that were associated with themain effect
of task (order > event) in the two-way ANOVA (i.e., the
anterior insula, right rostrolateral pFC, and precuneus)
did not survive whole-brain correction for multiple com-
parisons ( p< .05, FWE-corrected) in the conjunction anal-
ysis but were all significant at a relaxed threshold ( p <
.001, uncorrected). A direct contrast between the past
and future order conditions did not reveal any significant
difference.
Next, we examined whether the brain regions recruited
for determining the order of past and future events were
modulated by the temporal distance separating the two
events of a pair. To identify regions where activity mono-
tonically increased or decreased as a function of temporal
distance, we conducted parametric modulation analyses
with the number of days separating the events as linear
parametric modulator. This parametric analysis was con-
ducted separately for past and future events and the con-
trast of interests were inclusively masked with the main
effect of Task (order > event) identified in the two-way
ANOVA reported above to ensure that the identified re-
gions were involved in temporal order processing. No
brain regions showed a significant positive or negative
correlation with time lag at p < .05, FWE-corrected over
the entire brain volume. However, further analyses using
small volume correction within anatomically defined ROIs
(see Methods) identified a region of the right posterior
IPS showing a negative correlation with time lag in the
past order condition, suggesting that the right posterior
IPS was recruited to a greater extent for processing the
order of past events that were closer to each other in time
(peak MNI coordinate: x = 36, y = −64, z = 52; t =
5.01, p = .03; cluster size: 6 voxels; Figure 4A); there was
no significant correlation between time lag and activity
within the hippocampal and prefrontal ROIs. For future
events, there was no significant correlation between time
lag and activity within the selected ROIs, but an explora-
tory analysis at a relaxed threshold ( p< .001, uncorrected,
with a minimum of five contiguous voxels) revealed a
region of the left posterior IPS showing a negative correla-
tionwith time lag (peakMNI coordinate: x=−30, y=−68,
z = 36; t = 4.09; cluster size: 12 voxels; Figure 4B).
DISCUSSION
Although considerable progress has recently been made in
elucidating how autobiographical thoughts are constructed
and elaborated (Mullally & Maguire, 2014; DʼArgembeau,
2012; Schacter et al., 2012), relatively little is known about
their temporal dimension, especially with respect to the
future (Klein, 2013; Szpunar, 2011; Friedman, 2005). Here
we focused on the event-sequencing aspect of time and
investigated whether similar or distinct neurocognitive
processes are involved in ordering past events and planned
future events. Our findings revealed important common-
alities in temporal order processing for past and future
events, both in terms of behavioral performance and re-
gional brain activation. Behavioral results showed that judg-
ments of temporal order were above chance for both past
and future events (with no significant difference in perfor-
mance between the two kinds of events), demonstrating
that coherent knowledge about the order of personal
events can be formed not only for the past (in line with pre-
vious findings; St Jacques et al., 2008; Skowronski et al.,
2003), but also for the future. Moreover, we found that
the temporal distance between the two events of a pair
influenced order judgments in a similar way for past and
future events. The fMRI data indicated that the same brain
regions were recruited for determining the order of past
and future events, with no significant difference between
the two kinds of events. Collectively, these findings suggest
that the same processing operations were engaged for
ordering past events and planned future events in time.
Although neuroimaging studies have repeatedly shown
hippocampal activations when people remember past
events or imagine future events (e.g., Addis,Wong,&Schacter,
2007; Okuda et al., 2003; for a recent meta-analysis, see
Viard, Desgranges, Eustache, & Piolino, 2012), the question






Size tx y z
Middle temporal gyrus R 60 −60 10 195 6.97
L −60 −64 6 66 5.75
−64 −14 −18 5 5.39
Inferior temporal gyrus R 36 16 −36 4 5.32
L −46 −2 −40 4 5.24
Medial OFC M −2 44 −22 140 6.68
Anterior hippocampus R 20 −10 −18 64 6.47
L −22 −8 −26 3 5.04
Dorsal MPFC M −6 58 18 207 6.12
8 60 20 same 6.00
−10 52 38 18 5.74
Postcentral gyrus R 28 −32 70 34 6.11
Supramarginal gyrus R 66 −32 28 63 5.94
Middle cingulate cortex M 6 −16 44 17 5.36
All regions are significant at p< .05, corrected for multiple comparisons
(FWE) at the voxel level over the entire brain volume. L and R refer to
the left and right hemisphere, respectively. M refers to medial clusters.
For large clusters, local maxima that are more than 10 mm apart are
reported; “same” indicates that these local maxima are part of the same
cluster as the peak reported above.
DʼArgembeau et al. 191
of whether the hippocampus contributes to locating events
in time is still debated. On the one hand, there is evidence
that the hippocampus is activated when imagining events
or scenes that are not located at particular times in the past
or future (Summerfield et al., 2010; Hassabis et al., 2007),
and a recent study failed to detect significant hippocampal
activity when participants placed an imagined event in the
Table 4. Brain Regions Showing Increased Activity for Both





Size tx y z
IPS L −30 −60 42 31 5.58a
R 38 −60 32 18 5.35a
Visual cortex L −10 −78 2 21 5.45a
Dorsal ACC/pre-SMA M 6 22 42 47 5.42a
Dorsolateral pFC R 32 12 60 14 5.40a
Posterior hippocampus L −24 −36 4 2 3.30b
L and R refer to the left and right hemisphere, respectively. M refers to
medial clusters.
aSignificant at p < .05, corrected for multiple comparisons (FWE) at the
voxel level over the entire brain volume.
bSignificant at p < .05, corrected for multiple comparisons (FWE) using
small volume correction (see Methods).
Figure 3. Brain regions
showing increased activity for
event versus order judgments.
Displayed at p < .05 (FWE-
corrected) on the mean
structural MRI of all participants.
Bar graphs show the mean
parameter estimates for each
condition (error bars represent
SEM). mOFC = medial OFC;
dmPFC = dorsomedial pFC;
MTG = middle temporal gyrus.
Figure 4. Brain regions showing a temporal distance effect during
order judgments. (A) The right IPS showed greater activity when
processing the order of past events that were closer to each other in
time. (B) The left IPS showed greater activity when processing the
order of future events that were closer to each other in time. Displayed
at p< .001 (uncorrected) on the mean structural MRI of all participants.
The three-dimensional graphs represent parametric plots of the group
average of each participantʼs fitted data.
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past or future relative to a condition in which they imag-
ined the same event occurring in the present moment
(Nyberg et al., 2010). These findings have led to the view
that the hippocampus contributes to event representation
(i.e., the construction of spatially coherent scenes) rather
than temporal processes (Mullally & Maguire, 2014; Eacott
& Easton, 2012; Hassabis & Maguire, 2007). On the other
hand, studies that specifically focused on the event-
sequencing aspect of time demonstrated hippocampal
activations during the retrieval of temporal order (Ekstrom
et al., 2011; Lehn et al., 2009), suggesting that the hippo-
campus plays a role in the temporal organization of event
representations (Eichenbaum, 2013).
Our finding that event content and temporal order
were both associated with hippocampal activations, but
in distinct portions, may help reconcile these two views
on the contribution of the hippocampus to past and
future thought. Indeed, our data suggest a dissociation
between anterior and posterior hippocampal regions in
processing different aspects of autobiographical thought,
with the anterior hippocampus being involved in rep-
resenting the content of past and future events and the
posterior hippocampus in determining their temporal
order.1 This distinction is consistent with a recent model
of long-axis hippocampal specialization, whereby the
anterior and posterior hippocampus represent information
at coarse and fine granularities, respectively (Poppenk,
Evensmoen, Moscovitch, & Nadel, 2013). Applying this
model to autobiographical thought, Poppenk et al.
(2013) proposed that the anterior hippocampusmight sup-
port gist-based representations of event content (by form-
ing associative links between the principal actors, actions,
and setting of an event), whereas the posterior hippo-
campus might represent more specific contextual details,
including temporal information. The left posterior hippo-
campal region observed here could thus contribute to
establish temporal order in past and future thought either
by representing temporal information itself or by repre-
senting other contextual details that are used to infer tem-
poral information (see Friedman, 1993, for further
discussion of how contextual information associated with
an event can be used to infer its location in time). In line
with this view, it has been shown that activity within the left
posterior hippocampus correlates with the amount of
details experienced when representing past and future
events (Addis & Schacter, 2008; see also Viard et al., 2012).
Another important finding of this study is that many
brain regions that were activated when thinking about
temporal order—notably the IPS, lateral pFC, dorsal
ACC/pre-SMA, and anterior insula—lied outside the core
network that has been associated with autobiographical
memory and future thought (Mullally & Maguire, 2014;
Martinelli, Sperduti, & Piolino, 2013; Kim, 2012; Schacter
et al., 2012; McDermott, Szpunar, & Christ, 2009; Spreng,
Mar, & Kim, 2009). These regions are part of the fronto-
parietal and cingulo-opercular networks that have been
linked to cognitive control (Power & Petersen, 2013;
Dosenbach, Fair, Cohen, Schlaggar, & Petersen, 2008;
Vincent, Kahn, Snyder, Raichle, & Buckner, 2008), which
supports the idea that temporal information (or at least
temporal order) is not necessarily an intrinsic property of
memory or future thought but is often determined using
additional, effortful processes (Friedman, 1993, 2005).
Interestingly, recent studies have shown that autobiogra-
phical planning and goal-directed simulation (i.e., the
strategic formulation of plans to reach desired goal
states) engage not only the core network involved in past
and future thought, but also the frontoparietal control
network (Gerlach, Spreng, Madore, & Schacter, in press;
Gerlach, Spreng, Gilmore, & Schacter, 2011; Spreng, Stevens,
Chamberlain, Gilmore, & Schacter, 2010). Insofar as the
ability to order events in time is a key component of plan-
ning and goal pursuit, our findings align nicely with these
studies and further suggest that the frontoparietal control
network plays a role in the temporal organization of the
planning process (e.g., sequencing events in time).
The frontal components of the frontoparietal network,
as well as other prefrontal areas, have been linked to the
processing of temporal order for past events (e.g., Ekstrom
et al., 2011; St Jacques et al., 2008; Fujii et al., 2004), and
our data show that the same prefrontal regions are in-
volved in ordering planned future events, providing addi-
tional support to the general view that the lateral pFC
contributes to the temporal organization of cognition and
behavior (Fuster, 2001; Ingvar, 1985). In line with our pre-
dictions, we also found that the parietal cortex and, more
specifically, the IPS contribute to order processing in auto-
biographical thought. One interpretation of this finding is
that people use spatial representations to order past and
future events in time and that the IPS supports such
time-space mappings (Bueti & Walsh, 2009). There is in-
deed substantial evidence that time is construed in terms
of space (e.g., Nunez & Cooperrider, 2013; Christian et al.,
2012; Arzy, Adi-Japha, et al., 2009; Boroditsky, 2000), and
research has shown that visuospatial imagery contributes
to the representation of time patterns of relevance to this
study, such as the days of the week (Friedman, 2005). The
view that visuospatial processes contributes to temporal
order judgments is further supported by our finding that
these judgments also engaged the visual cortex and pre-
cuneus (more specifically a dorsal–posterior section of
the precuneus that has been associated with visuospatial
imagery; Zhang & Li, 2012). Indeed, when considered as
a whole, the brain regions that were activated during
temporal order judgments—the IPS, precuneus, occipital
cortex, and lateral pFC—closely correspond to the neural
network that has been linked to visuospatial imagery (Sack
& Schuhmann, 2012).
The present results further showed that the IPS was
recruited to a greater extent when the events people
had to order were closer to each other in time. A possible
interpretation of this finding is that, with decreasing time
lag between events, it is more difficult to discriminate the
respective locations of events on a mental time line, thus
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placing higher demands on the IPS. Another possible
interpretation of the effect of temporal distance on IPS
activity draws on the idea that the IPS may play a general
role in ordinal processing. Distance effects in IPS activity
have indeed been observed in many different domains, in-
cluding numerical and alphabetical processing (Fias,
Lammertyn, Caessens, & Orban, 2007; Pinel, Dehaene,
Riviere, & LeBihan, 2001), and STM for order (Attout, Fias,
Salmon, & Majerus, 2014; Marshuetz, Reuter-Lorenz,
Smith, Jonides, & Noll, 2006). These and related findings
have led to the view that the IPS (especially the anterior
IPS) supports domain general ordinal processes that allow
coding for serial order in various task domains (Attout
et al., 2014). As time frames such as the days of the week
contain an inherently ordinal structure, it could be that
the distance effect in IPS activity observed here reflects
the use of ordinal processing to determine the relative
order of events. It should be noted, however, that the
location of IPS activation we detected in this study is pos-
terior to the region that has been typically associated with
ordinal processing, although some studies have demon-
strated distance effects in the posterior IPS as well (e.g.,
Pinel et al., 2001).
When examining the brain regions associated with rep-
resenting the content of past and future events, we de-
tected activation in some but not all regions of the core
network that has been associated with autobiographical
thought (Schacter et al., 2012). Notably, we did not find
differential activation in two central regions of the core
network: the anterior medial pFC and posterior cingulate
cortex (Andrews-Hanna, Reidler, Sepulcre, Poulin, &
Buckner, 2010). This is likely because of the nature of
the comparison task: In this study, representing the con-
tent of past and future events was compared with a task
that also involved personal events (the temporal order
task), whereas previous studies that have shown activa-
tion of the entire core network compared the represen-
tation of past and future events with control tasks that
involved the retrieval of nonpersonal information from
semantic memory or the imagination of nonpersonal
events (e.g., Botzung, Denkova, & Manning, 2008; Addis
et al., 2007; Szpunar, Watson, & McDermott, 2007). Mid-
line cortical regions such as the medial pFC may contrib-
ute to represent the personal significance of past and
future events (Andrews-Hanna et al., 2010; DʼArgembeau
et al., 2010), a process that was likely subtracted out in
the current study as the same personal events were used
in the two conditions of interest.
Although the present behavioral and neuroimaging
results suggest that common cognitive processes are in-
volved in ordering past events and planned future events
in time, the precise nature of these processes remains to
be fully specified. One possibility is that people locate
events within known time patterns (such as the parts of
the day, week, and year), and as already discussed, this
process may in part depend on visuospatial imagery
(Friedman, 2005). Another, not incompatible but per-
haps additional, process may consist in retrieving order
codes to make order judgments (Friedman, 1993). For
past events, an order code may be created when a par-
ticular event reminds a previous event and information
about the relative order of the two events is encoded
in and thus can later be retrieved from memory. A similar
case can be made for future events: When imagining a
future event, one may remember another related future
event that one has previously envisioned and an order
code that links the two events may be established in
memory. Indeed, recent findings have shown that both
past and future events are frequently part of event clusters
that link a series of events together and organize them
in causal sequences (DʼArgembeau & Demblon, 2012).
Finally, people could in part base their judgments on
feelings of subjective distance (DʼArgembeau & Van der
Linden, 2012; Friedman, 1993), and for a few events, exact
dates might be available (Friedman, 1993, 2005).
As a final point, it should be noted that this study
investigated temporal order processing in future thoughts
that have already been established in memory—referred to
as “memories of the future” (Szpunar, Addis, McLelland, &
Schacter, 2013; Ingvar, 1985). Indeed, the future events
that were presented to participants in the scanner had
already been imagined on a previous occasion and were
associated with specific temporal locations. Another
important question that would be worthy of consideration
in future studies is how the temporal location of a future
event is established in the first place (i.e., when imagining
this event for the first time). Elucidating this question may
be key in understandingwhat distinguishes future thoughts
from other types of imagined events—events that can be
vividly imaginedbut arenot accompaniedby the feeling that
they will actually occur in oneʼs personal future (de Vito,
Gamboz, & Brandimonte, 2012). An intriguing possibility is
that an imagined event may become truly autobiographical
—in the sense of being associated with a sense of personal
plausibility (Scoboria, Mazzoni, Kirsch, & Relyea, 2004)—
only when it acquires a temporal context by virtue of its
integration in higher-order event sequences that are estab-
lished for goal pursuit (DʼArgembeau & Demblon, 2012).
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Note
1. Another possible interpretation of the activation of the
anterior hippocampus observed in this study would be that it
reflects differences in novelty signals between conditions (e.g.,
194 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 27, Number 1
Kafkas & Montaldi, 2014). Indeed, it could be argued that the
two conditions involved different amount of stimulus novelty
because the temporal ordering task included two events that
had been generated during the prescan interview, whereas
the event task contained one event that had been generated
in the prescan interview and one event taken from another per-
son. Although this interpretation in terms of stimulus novelty
cannot be totally excluded, we believe it is unlikely for two rea-
sons. First, the nonpersonal events that were included in the
event task were repeated three times throughout the fMRI ses-
sion, thus minimizing possible stimulus novelty effects. Second,
participants were instructed to focus on representing the con-
tent of the personal (i.e., more familiar) events.
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